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Abstract
Covariation information can be used to infer whether a causal link plausibly exists between two dichotomous variables, and such
judgments of contingency are central to many critical and everyday decisions. However, individuals do not always interpret and
integrate covariation information effectively, an issue that may be compounded by limited numeracy skills, and they often resort to
the use of heuristics, which can result in inaccurate judgments. This experiment investigated whether presenting covariation
information in a composite bar chart increased accuracy of contingency judgments, and whether it can mitigate errors driven by
low numeracy skills. Participants completed an online questionnaire, which consisted of an 11-item numeracy scale and three
covariation problems that varied in level of difficulty, involving a fictitious fertilizer and its impact on whether a plant bloomed or
not. Half received summary covariation information in a composite bar chart, and half in a 2 × 2 matrix that summarized event
frequencies. Viewing the composite bar charts increased accuracy of individuals both high and low in numeracy, regardless of
problem difficulty, resulted in more consistent judgments that were closer to the normatively correct value, and increased the
likelihood of detecting the correct direction of association. Findings are consistent with prior work, suggesting that composite bar
charts are an effective way to improve covariation judgment and have potential for use in the domain of health risk communication.
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Introduction
The covariation or contingency between two events concerns
the degree to which they are associated and may be defined in
terms of their co-occurrence—that is, the extent to which one
event is likely to occur given the presence or absence of the
other event. In the absence of expertise or prior beliefs on
which to base a conclusion, the evaluation of contingency
information can be used to infer or refute a potential causal
relationship and obtain an estimate of its strength. Therefore,
judgments of contingency are often central to everyday human
behaviour and decision-making. For example, a student might
be interested in whether a revision program boosts examina-
tion success before deciding whether to enroll, and a patient
with a skin condition might wish to ascertain whether a treat-
ment is effective before deciding whether to use it or not.
Given that such judgments can have far-reaching conse-
quences, it is important to understand how they are arrived
at and the factors that influence them, including how best to
present contingency information to aid comprehension and
facilitate optimal decisions.
When considering whether one event (the candidate cause,
or CC) influences the occurrence of a second (the target effect),
there are four categories of information, and thismay be given in
a 2 × 2 contingency table (as shown in Fig. 1), where the rows
refer to the presence and absence of the CC, and the columns
refer to the presence and absence of the effect. Conventionally,
Cell A contains the frequency with which the CC and the effect
co-occur, Cell B the frequency that the CC is present and the
effect does not occur, Cell C the frequency that the effect is
present in the absence of the CC, and Cell D contains the fre-
quency with which the CC and the effect are both absent. Thus,
Cells A and D contain confirmatory evidence of a causal rela-
tionship, and Cells B and C contain disconfirmatory evidence.
A normative approach to evaluating the strength and direc-
tion of a relationship from contingency information is to
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calculate the difference between two conditional probabilities:
the probability of the effect given the CC and that of the effect
in the absence of the CC (Ward & Jenkins, 1965), or ΔP
(Allan, 1980; Kao & Wasserman, 1993):
ΔP ¼ P EjCCð Þ − P Ej ∼ CCð Þ ¼ A
Aþ B −
C
C þ D : ð1Þ
While this normative metric weighs cell frequencies equal-
ly, a long history of studies has demonstrated that when mak-
ing a covariation judgment there is a nonnormative tendency
to consider evidence supporting a positive association to be
more relevant; in particular, the order of cell importance is
perceived to be A > B > C > D (e.g., Crocker, 1982;
Shaklee & Tucker, 1980; Smedslund, 1963; Wasserman,
Dorner, & Kao, 1990). This differential weighting explains
several alternative strategies, or heuristics, which vary in
terms of complexity and sophistication (Arkes & Harkness,
1983; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980; Ward & Jenkins, 1965).
Least sophisticated is the Cell A heuristic, in which only
the contents of Cell A are considered: A positive covariation is
inferred if the frequency of these co-occurring incidences is
greater than all other cell frequencies, and a negative covaria-
tion is inferred if it is smaller. This has also been termed a
positive hits strategy (McKenzie, 1994), and observed by
many researchers (Arkes & Harkness, 1983; Shaklee &
Tucker, 1980; Ward & Jenkins, 1965). Alternatively, a posi-
tive test strategy (Klayman & Ha, 1987) relates to a tendency
to focus on cases that contain the property of interest, and
therefore involves an examination of Cells A and B (the prob-
ability of the effect given the cause) and/or Cells A and C (the
probability of the cause given the effect). Similarly, a propor-
tion of hits (McKenzie, 1994) or A versus B (Shaklee &Mims,
1981) strategy deems these two cells most pertinent, and a
relational judgement is made by using the frequencies therein
to calculate the probability of the effect given the cause.
Another strategy which considers the contents of Cells A
and B requires simply to calculate their difference (i.e., A −
B)—a hits minus false positives strategy (McKenzie, 1994,
supported also by Arkes & Harkness, 1983). These nonnor-
mative strategies (Cell-A/positive-hits, positive testing, pro-
portion-of-hits/A-versus-B, hits minus false positives) all have
in common that they only consider the contents of one or two
cells, the others (notably Cell D in all instances) are
disregarded. More demanding is the sum-of-diagonals heuris-
tic (Arkes &Harkness, 1983; Shaklee &Mims, 1981; Shaklee
& Tucker, 1980), in which confirmatory evidence (the sum of
Cells A and D) is compared with disconfirmatory evidence
(the sum of Cells B and C); a positive association is assumed if
(A +D) > (B + C), and a negative association if (A +D) < (B +
C). It is important to note that although both the sum-of-
diagonals and the ΔP strategies make use of all four cell
frequencies, only ΔP is normative and will provide an accu-
rate judgment for all problems. Furthermore, because different
strategies can produce the same judgment for some problems,
a sophisticated strategy cannot be inferred from accuracy
alone (Allan, 1980; Shaklee & Wasserman, 1986).
Although many studies have demonstrated this cell weight
inequality, and the consequential use of the various strategies
described, few have tried to explain why the inequality occurs
in the first place. It is important to understand the underlying
mechanisms for this effect so that boundary conditions can be
anticipated and, if necessary, appropriate interventions put in
place. One explanation is that people assess evidence in a way
that places greater weight on confirming a hypothesis than on
disconfirming it (e.g., Wason, 1960), and therefore tend to test
a hypothesis by examining cases that are known to have the
property of interest rather than those that lack it (Klayman &
Ha, 1987). Crocker (1982) also suggests that individuals re-
gard positive confirming cases as most relevant when forming
a judgment, and negative confirming cases least relevant.
Thus, when considering covariation information, Cell A
would be considered most salient as it contains the frequency
of positive confirming cases which concern both properties of
interest (the candidate cause and the effect), Cells B and C less
influential as they each concern only one such property. In
turn, Cell D would be considered least important as neither
property is present in the negative confirming cases represent-
ed by this frequency. Cell B will receive somewhat more
emphasis than Cell C since a comparison of Cells A and B
(the probability of the effect given the cause) is more consis-
tent with a temporal order of causation than a comparison of
Cells A and C (the probability of the cause given the effect).
There is often also a greater attention to the sufficiency of rules
than to their necessity—in other words, it is less surprising that
the effect might occur without the candidate cause, than that
the effect might not occur when the candidate cause is present.
This tendency to focus on the target class in judgments of
probability can be termed denominator neglect, whereby too
Fig. 1 A 2 × 2 contingency table. CC = candidate cause present; ~CC =
candidate cause absent; E = effect present; ~E = effect absent. A, B, C,
and D represent individual cell frequencies
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much attention is given to numerators (the number of times an
event happens) and insufficient attention to the overall number
of opportunities for the event to happen, which is the denom-
inator in the calculation of probability (Reyna & Brainerd,
2008). Thus, when presented with covariation information,
the focus would be on the magnitude of the frequency in
Cell A since it is the numerator of both P(E|CC) and
P(CC|E), followed by Cells B and C as the numerators of
P(CC|~E) and P(E|~CC) respectively, to the neglect of Cell
D, which is only incorporated into denominators.
Denominator neglect can be accounted for by fuzzy-trace the-
ory (FTT; Reyna, 2004; Reyna & Brainerd, 1994), a dual-
process model of memory and reasoning in which not only
verbatim but gist (less precise, hence “fuzzy”) representations
of relevant frequencies are encoded, and confusion occurs
because the target class is included in the denominator that
encompasses both target and nontarget classes. This theory
suggests a preference for reasoning with the most essential,
gist-based representations permissible for a given task—
which is often sufficient to deliver an accurate solution—
whenever possible. Hence, when comparing probabilities,
the salient gist of the problem is the relative size of target
categories (the numerators); their comparison therefore be-
comes the basis for a judgment, and the application of any
cued knowledge about ratios is stymied because of confusion
created by the overlap between the size of these target catego-
ries and that of the overall classes from which they were
drawn (the denominators).
Numeracy
Numerical information must frequently be considered when
making decisions in a wide variety of scenarios (e.g., nutri-
tional information on food labels, prices for best value, and
risk information for insurance and health choices). However,
the evaluation of numbers can be difficult because they can
appear in different forms (e.g., 5%, 1 in 20, 0.05), and some
manipulation or integration may be required (e.g., 5% off, buy
two get one free). Furthermore, the same value may warrant a
different interpretation depending on the context in which it is
presented (e.g., a 10% pay rise might be considered good, but
a 10% risk of disease as bad). Numeracy, or the ability to
process probabilistic and numerical concepts, is therefore of-
ten required to make good choices (Peters et al., 2006; Reyna
& Brainerd, 2008). Research suggests that numeracy levels
vary substantially across the population. In particular, the as-
sociation between numeracy and the understanding of risk
information appears to be a very robust phenomenon (for
reviews, see Peters, Hibbard, Slovic, & Dieckmann, 2007;
Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009), numeracy ac-
counting for unique variance beyond that accounted for by
education and general intelligence (Peters et al., 2006), such
that even highly educated individuals find it difficult to
comprehend numerical information when making decisions
(Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001).
Research also suggests that numeracy goes beyond the
ability to comprehend and transform numbers. For example,
a higher level of numeracy has been associated with reduced
susceptibility to context and framing effects (Peters et al.,
2006), and, when compared with other cognitive factors such
as working memory span and impulsivity, predicts
normatively superior decisions owing to an association with
a more conscious, thorough, and elaborative search for a
solution. For example, Cokely and Kelley (2009) found that
while the proportion of choices consistent with expected value
in a series of risky choice problems (e.g., $125 or 30% chance
to win $900) was significantly related to numeracy, protocol
analysis revealed little evidence of expected-value calcula-
tions, but rather an elaborative heuristic search through a num-
ber of simple (albeit often number related) considerations
(e.g., $900 is a lot more than $125, 30% chance to win is
the same as 70% chance to lose). Alternatively, focus was
on the gist of the problem (FTT; Reyna, 2004), and while all
individuals may prefer to process surface features of a prob-
lem in this way, the highly numerate are more likely to derive
a richer gist when the information is numeric. Thus, greater
numeracy involves a reliance on superior number-related in-
tuition supplemented with the conscious ability to recognize
when an analytical mode (e.g., number integration) needs to
be employed (Peters, 2012).
There has been much research regarding the role of numer-
acy in Bayesian reasoning, where it has been found to be
positively related to accuracy (Chapman & Liu, 2009; Sirota
& Juanchich, 2011; G. Vallée-Tourangeau, Abadie, & Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2015; Wu, Meder, Filimon, & Nelson, 2017).
Numeracy has also been investigated in health-related deci-
sion-making (Galesic, Garcia-Retamero, & Gigerenzer, 2009;
Peters, Hibbard, et al., 2007; Reyna et al., 2009; Schwartz,
Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 1997). The numerical reasoning
required in this domain involves the ratio concepts (fractions,
percentages, and proportions) that are fundamental to the un-
derstanding of risk and probability, and which are also partic-
ularly challenging and prone to biases that undermine judg-
ment and decision-making (Reyna & Brainerd, 2007), notably
denominator neglect, and ratio bias, which is the perception
that a low-probability event is more likely when drawn from a
larger sample, even when the probabilities are identical or
slightly worse (e.g., 10/100 and 9/100 preferable to 1/10;
Reyna & Brainerd, 2008). These studies demonstrate that
higher numeracy is associated with better comprehension
and integration of numerical information, leading to more
informed decisions and better medical outcomes. For
example, Schwartz et al. (1997) found that high-numeracy
individuals were better able to use information about breast
cancer reduction associated with mammography than those
who were low in numeracy; Peters, Dieckmann, Dixon,
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Hibbard, and Mertz (2007) found the highly numerate chose
better quality hospitals based on numerical information about
medical outcomes than those who were lower in numeracy
(for further examples, see Reyna & Brainerd, 2007). Clearly,
poor numeracy might be a barrier to making good health
choices. Therefore, careful consideration should be given to
the presentation of numerical information, and how this inter-
acts with numerical ability, to improve comprehension, aid
evaluation, and encourage best decisions.
Representational effects
Research into problem solving and judgment under uncertain-
ty has demonstrated that the format in which information is
presented to reasoners can have a dramatic effect on problem
difficulty, and influence the cognitive strategies employed. In
particular, graphical displays can facilitate the communication
and comprehension of information by attracting and holding
attention to a concrete, visual display, summarizing large
amounts of data, and drawing attention to patterns (Lipkus,
2007). Furthermore, graphical representations can support
mathematical problem solving as related information is
grouped together, which reduces search time, cues the relevant
comparisons, and assists computation (Larkin & Simon,
1987). Pertinent to the examination of causal inferences, it
was found that judgments were more normative when covari-
ation information was presented graphically in a cumulative
frequency tree rather than as a set of four simple propositions
(F. Vallée-Tourangeau, Payton, & Murphy, 2008). In short, a
well-designed visual display can aid comprehension and eval-
uation by scaffolding mental computation with direct visual
inferences.
One area in which the effect of presentation format has
been much studied is that of health-risk communication.
Research has documented that patients and health profes-
sionals alike struggle to grasp numerical concepts that are
prerequisites for the accurate evaluation, comprehension,
and communication of health-relevant risk information
(Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, &
Woloshin, 2007). Decision-making aids such as visual dis-
plays have helped overcome some of these difficulties for
individuals of varying cognitive ability, age, and background
(for reviews, see Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2013, 2017). In
particular, and replicating the effects of earlier FTT experi-
ments, the use of icon arrays has been shown to enhance
comprehension of health-related risks (Fagerlin, Wang, &
Ubel, 2005; Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2008) and benefit low-
numeracy individuals especially (Galesic et al., 2009). An
icon array depicts a risk using a matrix of individual symbols,
such as asterisks or stick figures, some of which are highlight-
ed as being affected in some way. Thus, an icon array illus-
trates a part-to-whole relationship, and proportions are visual-
ly available to judge. However, although the addition of icon
arrays to numerical information has been shown to reduce
denominator neglect when comparing unequally sized treat-
ment groups (Garcia-Retamero, Galesic, & Gigerenzer,
2010), the perceived seriousness of otherwise equivalent risks
in two icon arrays was found to be greater when the array
contained a larger overall number of icons (e.g., 1,000 rather
than 100), which does fit with a ratio-bias effect (Galesic et al.,
2009). Furthermore, Galesic et al. (2009) found that risks ap-
pear less serious when presented in an icon array relative to a
numerical representation, suggesting this is because attention
is drawn to what is often a large number of unaffected people.
Hence, icon arrays may be used to emphasize either the num-
ber affected (numerator) or the total number at risk
(denominator).
The importance of portraying the part-to-whole relation-
ship in a graphical display to aid decisions involving risk
was explored in a series of studies by Stone and colleagues
(Schirillo & Stone, 2005; Stone et al., 2003). They refer to the
classes of information in a risk ratio as “foreground” (target
group, numerator), and “background” (total number at risk,
denominator), and suggest that by drawing attention to one
or the other it is possible to make a risk seem either large or
small. In an earlier study, Stone, Yates, and Parker (1997)
found that a graphical format that highlighted the number of
people harmed (i.e., foreground information) by a negative
event that occurred while using a certain product increased
willingness to pay (relative to a numerical format) for an im-
proved, safer product that reduced the risk of the event by
50%, even though the risk itself was extremely small (e.g.,
30 in 5,000 vs. 15 in 5,000). However, Stone et al. (2003)
demonstrated that when the graphical format displayed both
the number harmed and the total number at risk (i.e., both
foreground and background information), this effect was elim-
inated. They propose that the observed increase in professed
risk-avoidant behaviour when foreground information is
highlighted is caused by the perception that risk reduction is
greater, which is in turn due to a focus on the difference in
numbers harmed (e.g., 30 vs. 15) made salient by the graphical
display, whereas when both foreground and background in-
formation are displayed either graphically or numerically, the
focus is on the total at risk (e.g., 5,000), which makes the
reduction appear small since it shows the chances of harm
are slight with either product. Thus, when selecting a graphi-
cal display format, consideration should be given to its overall
purpose—for example, whether the intention is to enhance
quantitative understanding or to promote behaviour change.
A normative contingency judgment involves the compari-
son of two conditional probabilities which enumerate the pro-
portion of cases where the effect occurs as a subset of those
with, and without, the candidate cause. However, as predicted
by FTT, conditional probabilities involving subsets can be
particularly difficult to determine as the nested relationship
can foster confusion regarding denominators (Wolfe, Fisher,
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Reyna, & Hu, 2012). Hence, it is important that presentation
formats depicting covariation information draw attention to
this relationship. Indeed, research has demonstrated that inter-
ventions which accentuate the appropriate denominators in
problems involving nested subsets (e.g., Euler diagrams, icon
arrays) result in more accurate assessments of conditional
probability (Galesic et al., 2009; Garcia-Retamero et al.,
2010; Wolfe, Fisher, & Reyna, 2013; Wolfe et al., 2012). As
proposed by Stone et al. (2003), an alternative graphical for-
mat which overcomes these problems is the stacked, or com-
posite, bar graph. Research into health risk communication
also suggests that visual formats such as composite bar graphs
promote accurate judgments of a part-to-whole relationship
since the numerator (number affected) and the denominator
(total under study) are represented proportionally (for reviews,
see Ancker, Senathirajah, Kukafka, & Starren, 2006; Lipkus,
2007).
The present experiment
Much of the research on the communication of risk has exam-
ined situations where the event probability is small. For ex-
ample, in the health domain, most hazards (e.g., suffering
from the side effects of a drug, developing breast cancer) have
extremely low probabilities of occurring from an individual
perspective. Therefore, communication techniques have fo-
cussed on low-probability risk magnitudes. Furthermore, and
once again particularly in the health domain, studies have
often investigated graphical representations that encourage
the modification of risk-relevant behaviour, and hence draw
attention to the risk evenwhen it is small. Such representations
do not necessarily enhance comprehension of the risk infor-
mation in any absolute sense (e.g., Stone et al., 1997).
However, in the case of contingency judgments, the probabil-
ities involved may be of any level, and the focus is not only on
a comparison to determine which of two options is preferable,
but also to directly evaluate the strength of any preference,
giving due consideration to all information provided. As such,
this experiment adds to prior research into the effectiveness of
graphical formats by assessing their potential to facilitate an
enhanced and objective assessment of comparative risks.
The purpose of this experiment was twofold. The first was
to investigate the impact of problem difficulty on causal judg-
ments when contingency information is presented in a graph-
ical as opposed to a 2 × 2 matrix form. A problem might be
classified as easy if the employment of multiple strategies,
including the very simplest, or commonly used heuristics
(e.g., Cell A, A versus B, sum-of-diagonals) will result in a
correct judgment. Although it would be impossible to infer
which strategy was used, a correct response is more likely
for such a problem simply because many strategies will
achieve it. A difficult problem might be classified as one for
which only a normative strategy (i.e., ΔP) will result in a
correct judgment, and therefore one where the significant ma-
nipulation of cell frequencies (and numeracy) is required.
There are of course other potential combinations of cell fre-
quencies in a covariation problem, such that although the sim-
plest strategies (e.g., Cell A) will be unsuccessful, some basic
numerical manipulation (e.g., the comparison of confirmatory
evidence in Cells A and D with disconfirmatory evidence in
Cells B and C) will result in a correct judgment without having
to calculate ΔP, and these might be classified as being of
medium difficulty.
The second purpose of this experiment was to investigate
the degree to which numeracy moderated the influence of
problem difficulty on causal judgments in each presentation
format. We conjectured that presenting the contingency infor-
mation in a composite bar graph should lead to more accurate
judgments overall relative to a contingency table (2 × 2 ma-
trix) format and could scaffold judgment even for more diffi-
cult problems. Furthermore, numeracy should moderate the
impact of problem difficulty when information is displayed
in a contingency table, but to a lesser extent when displayed
in a composite bar graph.
Method
Participants
One hundred and forty-nine individuals in total participated in
this experiment. Twenty-two participants did not respond to
all items in the questionnaire, so their data were excluded,
leaving 127 complete responses in the analysis.1 The majority
(92.9%) were recruited via social media (Facebook and
Twitter), and the remainder were undergraduate psychology
students who participated in exchange for course credits.
Participants were aged 19–75 years (M = 42.3, SD = 14.2);
71.7% female; 22.1% reported no degree, 28.3% a bachelor’s
degree, and 49.6% a postgraduate degree. Of the graduates
and postgraduates, 24.2% had studied STEM subjects.
Materials
The experiment was presented on Qualtrics. Individual differ-
ences were measured using a series of demographic questions
(age, gender, and level of education), and the 11-item numer-
acy scale developed by Lipkus et al. (2001). This scale as-
sesses practical knowledge of probabilistic concepts and sim-
ple mathematical operations, including the ability to compre-
hend and transform risk magnitudes given as percentages,
fractions, decimals, and proportions. It is a widely used and
1 In the absence of any directly comparable studies reporting effect sizes with
which to conduct an a priori power analysis, our sample size was determined to
allow the detection of a small effect of 0.3, assuming α = .05 and 1 − β = .50.
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accepted measurement instrument to assess numeracy in
health and medical decision-making, as well as other judg-
ment and decision tasks (e.g., Galesic et al., 2009; Peters
et al., 2006), and for diverse populations (see Garcia-
Retamero & Cokely, 2017, for further examples).
For the contingency judgment task, a fictitious scenario
was presented describing an experimental plant fertilizer and
tests to determine whether it promoted a certain exotic plant
(the Lanyu) to bloom (adapted from Kao & Wasserman,
1993). The scenario was followed by three sets of covariation
information concerning the number of plants that had or had
not been given the fertilizer, and the number that had or had
not bloomed. All participants were given this information as a
set of four simple propositions, followed by a summarized
version in either a contingency table or composite bar graph.
The problem for the participants was to determine whether
each of the three fertilizers was effective in promoting the
Lanyu to bloom. They were asked to indicate this on a scale
ranging from −10 (the fertilizer has a strong negative effect on
the plant’s blooming), through 0 (no effect), to +10 (the fer-
tilizer has a strong positive effect on the plant’s blooming).
Crucially, in all three cases the fertilizer had a slight negative
effect on whether the Lanyu bloomed with ΔP = −.1, and
hence the normatively correct response on the scale used in
this experiment was −1.
Design and procedure
The experiment employed a 2 × 3mixed design. The between-
subjects variable was presentation format: In the contingency
table (CT) condition, the results for each fertilizer were given
in the classic 2 × 2 matrix format; in the bar graph (BG)
condition, the results were displayed in a horizontal composite
bar chart. The within-subjects variable was problem difficulty:
hard, medium, and easy.
To examine where a potential facilitating effect of presen-
tation format occurs, the three problems were hierarchically
structured to allow discrimination between possible judgment
strategies. Thus, the results for the first fertilizer (F1, hard)
were devised such that a correct contingency judgment could
only be arrived at usingΔP, with Cell A containing the largest
frequency, and (A + D) > (B + C) so that all nonnormative
strategies (Cell A, positive testing, A versus B, hits minus
false positives, sum-of-diagonals) would be unsuccessful in
gauging the negative contingency. A correct judgment for
the second fertilizer (F2, medium) could be obtained using
either ΔP or the sum-of-diagonals heuristic; Cell A still con-
tains the largest frequency so that strategies involving only
Cells A and B and/or Cells A and C would be unsuccessful,
but now (A + D) < (B + C), and hence might be evaluated
accurately with a sum-of-diagonals strategy. Finally, for the
third problem (F3, easy), a correct inference could additional-
ly be based on the simplest Cell A strategy since A < C as well
as (A +D) < (B + C). All three problems and their presentation
in the two format conditions are shown in Fig. 2.
Participants first answered the demographic questions.
Half were then randomly given the 11-item numeracy scale
followed by the contingency judgment problems; for the other
half, this order was reversed. Independent of this, participants
were randomly assigned to either the CT or BG condition. The
order in which the three covariation problems were presented
was also counterbalanced across participants.
Results
Of primary interest was accuracy in the contingency judgment
task as a function of presentation format and level of difficul-
ty. Figure 3 shows the mean judgment for each of the three
levels of difficulty in each of the two presentation formats. In
both the CT and BG conditions, judgments of contingency
were more negative when problems were easier; however, this
trend was more pronounced in the CT condition, judgments in
the BG condition appearing more consistent across the three
problems.
A 2 (presentation format, between subjects) × 3 (level of
difficulty, within subjects) mixed analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with a Greenhouse–Geisser correction2 revealed
a significant main effect for level of difficulty, F(1.81,
225.95) = 39.18, p < .001, ηp
2 = .239, but no main effect for
presentation format (F < 1). However, the interaction between
presentation format and level of difficulty, F(1.81, 225.95) =
8.76, p < .001, ηp
2 = .065, was significant. As expected, sim-
ple effects revealed that for the hard problem, judgments of
contingency were significantly more accurate in the BG con-
dition (M = −0.61, SD = 3.66) than in the CT condition (M =
0.98, SD = 4.80), t(115.89) = 2.09, p = .038, Cohen’s d = 0.37,
95% CI [0.02, 0.72]. Similarly, for the medium level of diffi-
culty, judgments were closer to the normatively correct value
of −1 in the BG condition (M = −1.24, SD = 2.54) than in the
CT condition (M = −0.08, SD = 4.02), although this difference
failed to reach significance, t(104.50) = 1.95, p = .054, d =
0.35, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.70]. There was also a significant dif-
ference in judgments for the easy problem, t(125) = −2.48, p =
.014, d = −0.44, 95% CI [−0.79, −0.09], once again responses
in the BG condition (M = −2.47, SD = 3.34) being more
accurate than those in the CT condition (M = −3.97, SD =
3.47). These comparisons suggest that although the main ef-
fect of presentation format was nonsignificant, contingency
was judged differently in the two conditions, but differences
depended on the level of difficulty.
2 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was not met, χ2(2)
= 13.96, p = .001.
394 Mem Cogn (2021) 49:389–399
The effects of numeracy on judgments of contingency
The mean numeracy score for all participants was 9.67 (SD =
1.72) with 44.9% responding correctly to all 11 items: The
distribution was highly skewed. Participants’ numeracy did
not differ between the BG condition (M = 9.89, SD = 1.43,
scores in range 6–11) and the CT condition (M = 9.44, SD =
1.96, scores in range 2–11), t(125) = −1.47, p = .144, d =
−0.26, 95% CI [−0.61, 0.09]. Figure 4 plots judgment of con-
tingency as a function of numeracy (mean centred form) in the
two format conditions for each problem type. Regression
slopes were negative, indicating that higher levels of
numeracy are associated with lower or negative judgments.
It can also be seen that gradients for the three problems are
similar in the CT condition, but more variable in the BG con-
dition. Correlations were significantly negative for all prob-
lems in the CT condition: hard, r(61) = −.255, p = .043, me-
dium, r(61) = −.317, p = .011, easy, r(61) = −.261, p = .039.
Correlations in the BG condition were also significantly neg-
ative for the hard, r(62) = −.327, p = .008, and the easy prob-
lem, r(62) = −.270, p = .031, but not for the medium problem,
r(62) = −.042, p = .744. This indicates that, apart from the
medium problem in the BG condition, numeracy was a sig-
nificant predictor of judgments. However, despite the initial
impressionwhen viewing Fig. 4 that the pattern of correlations
is somewhat different between presentation format conditions,
the coefficients for each problem type in fact do not differ
significantly. Furthermore, there is no interaction between nu-
meracy and format for any of the three problems. Hence, the
evidence here did not support our prediction: Numeracy gen-
erally explained a similar proportion of variance in contingen-
cy judgments in both conditions.3
3 As there was a nonsignificant difference between numeracy scores in the CT
and BG conditions, and similar gradients for the regression slopes can be seen
in Fig. 4, the effect of numeracy was investigated further by adding it as a
covariate in the ANOVA. Homogeneity of regression slopes was confirmed,
F(1, 123) = 0.06, p = .813. The analysis revealed a significant effect of nu-
meracy on judgments, F(1, 124) = 18.79, p < .001, ηp
2 = .132, and the signif-
icant main effect for level of difficulty remained, F(1.81, 225.95) = 39.18, p <
.001, ηp
2 = .239. After controlling for numeracy, the main effect of presenta-
tion format remained nonsignificant, F < 1, and the interaction between pre-
sentation format and level of difficulty remained significant, F(1.81, 223.80) =
8.38, p = .001, ηp
2 = .063. These results confirm the original analysis.
Fig. 2 Contingency judgment problems as presented to participants in the contingency table and bar graph conditions for the hard (left panel), medium
(middle panel), and easy (right panel) problems
Fig. 3 Mean judgment for the hard, medium, and easy problem in the
contingency table and bar graph conditions. Error bars are standard errors
of the mean
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Discussion
Understanding covariation information in order to determine a
potential causal relationship requires the consideration and
integration of four pieces of information: the frequency with
which the candidate cause and the effect co-occur, the fre-
quency that the candidate cause is present and the effect does
not occur, the frequency that the effect is present in the ab-
sence of the candidate cause, and the frequency with which
the candidate cause and the effect are both absent. However,
poor numerical ability and the use of heuristics can undermine
the normative appreciation of that evidence. This experiment
explored the degree to which presentation format and numer-
ical ability had an impact on judgments of contingency in
three covariation problems which ranged in level of difficulty.
Results indicate that presentation format did influence contin-
gency judgments, although the nature of the difference in
judgments depended on the level of problem difficulty.
The effects of presentation format
Consistent with the findings of Stone et al. (2003), when in-
formation was presented in a composite bar chart, judgments
were more accurate—closer to the normatively correct
value—for all three problems than when presented numerical-
ly in a contingency table. Participants viewing the contingen-
cy information in a summary table format were more inclined
to (incorrectly) perceive a positive contingency for the hard
and medium problems, and while they were able to detect the
negative association for the easy problem, they tended to over-
estimate its magnitude. Interestingly then, while the largest
effect was seen for the easy problem in terms of a reduction
in the magnitude of the negative judgment, it is for the hard
problem (and to a lesser extent for the medium problem) that
the use of composite bar graphs had the largest impact by
facilitating the shift from an intuitive, positive response to a
normative, negative response.
These results suggest that a simple and nonoptimal judg-
ment heuristic was cued when contingency information was
presented numerically in a 2 × 2 matrix, whereby cells were
weighted asymmetrically, as demonstrated by Crocker (1982),
Shaklee and Tucker (1980), Smedslund (1963), and
Wasserman et al. (1990) for example. Specifically, judgments
appear to have been based on the contents of Cell A, or a
comparison of Cells A and C, the frequency in Cell A being
much greater than that in Cell C in the hard problem, only
marginally greater in the medium problem, and smaller in the
easy problem. This is consistent with studies which have
found that people use nonnormative strategies in which focus
is placed on these cells (Arkes & Harkness, 1983; McKenzie,
1994; Shaklee &Mims, 1981; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980;Ward
& Jenkins, 1965), prefer to confirm a hypothesis by examin-
ing cases containing the property of interest (Klayman & Ha,
1987), and neglect denominators (Reyna & Brainerd, 2008).
These results are also predicted by FTT whereby the contents
of Cell A were encoded as a focal gist of the problem, and
confusion was created by the overlapping classes. However,
this pattern of judgments was eliminated for participants view-
ing information in the graphical format: They were more like-
ly to correctly infer the negative association for the hard and
medium problems, and in addition, the overestimation for the
easy problem was attenuated relative to the contingency table
condition. That the mean judgment for the easy problem in the
BG condition was considerably more negative than the nor-
mative −.1 suggests that even when viewing this graphical
format, some consideration was still given to the relative sizes
of target classes—namely, the magnitudes of the number of
plants that bloomed with and without the fertilizer. This was
the only problem for which the latter was greater and hence
represented by a larger bar area (see Fig. 2), potentially inflat-
ing the size of the negative judgment.
Thus, presenting covariation information in a composite
bar graph resulted in more consistent contingency judgments
regardless of difficulty. Furthermore, the use of a graphical
format appears to have inhibited denominator neglect, as
Fig. 4 Contingency judgment as a function of numeracy (mean centred form) in the contingency table (CT; open circles) and bar graph (BG; dark circles)
conditions for the hard (left panel), medium (middle panel), and easy (right panel) problems
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judgments were more normatively correct despite the un-
equally sized treatment groups. This supports research which
has found that a graphical form that draws attention to both the
numerator and denominator of a risk ratio, and their nested
relationship, enhances comprehension (Ancker et al., 2006;
Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2013, 2017; Garcia-Retamero
et al., 2010; Stone et al., 2003).
The effects of numeracy
Our results indicate that numeracy was associated with perfor-
mance in the contingency judgment task for both presentation
formats, and for all levels of difficulty; participants achieving a
higher score on the numeracy scale tended to make judgments
closer to the normatively correct value.We conjectured that low
numeracy would have less impact on performance when infor-
mation was viewed in a composite bar graph relative to a con-
tingency table, due to the reduced requirement to manipulate
numerical information. However, this was not the case.
Although there were some differences in the pattern of correla-
tions between numeracy and judgments in the two presentation
formats, more noticeably for the medium problem, numeracy
accounted for a similar proportion of variance in the two con-
ditions. Thus, viewing contingency information in the graphical
form enhanced performance for individuals both high and low
in numeracy. This finding contrasts with that of Galesic et al.
(2009), who found that graphical representations were especial-
ly useful in communicating medical risk to low-numeracy par-
ticipants. However, Galesic and colleagues used icon arrays
with equal base rates, meaning that the proportions represented
were easier to compare in the graphical format than in the
present experiment, which used unequal base rates.
Developmental researchers have demonstrated some time ago
the difficulties experienced by children in choosing which of
two containers is more likely to result in a draw of the target
object (e.g., a blue token from two containers with blue and red
tokens) when absolute and relative frequencies of the target
object are designed to conflict (see Reyna & Brainerd’s,
1994, review, and in particular Fig. 11.3).
Implications, limitations, and future research
The results reported here provide additional support to the body
of evidence which suggests that graphical representations can
enhance comprehension of numerical information, and that
problems in communication occur because inappropriate infor-
mation formats are often used. Specifically, graphical formats
that reduce detail and instead direct attention to the features of
the problem that are necessary to form a correct solution, are
most likely to be useful in achieving that solution (e.g., Liersch
& McKenzie, 2009). For contingency judgments, the salient
feature is the proportion (not the absolute number) of effect-
occurring cases within each of the cause-present and cause-
absent classes, which should be compared, and hence made
evident in the display. When this is done, strategies that incor-
porate concepts of proportion are more easily employed. Thus,
for the problems in this experiment, positive contingencies were
often perceived in the CT condition because the difference in
the number of effect-occurring cases looked larger than in the
BG condition where the size of the more inclusive cause-pres-
ent/cause-absent class could be seen more clearly.
We propose that the use of a composite bar chart could be
effective in conveying health risk information and alleviate
some of the issues identified with alternative graphical for-
mats. For example, icon arrays can make risks appear less
serious than a numerical representation as they show both
people who are affected by a risk and those who are not
(Galesic et al., 2009), thus drawing attention to what is often
a much larger number of unaffected people, and discouraging
a focus on just those affected (the numerator of the risk ratio),
which has been posited as the reason behind greater serious-
ness of risks observed in some numerical and visual formats
(Reyna & Brainerd, 1994; Stone et al., 2003). Galesic et al.
(2009) also found that otherwise equivalent risks appear more
serious when a larger overall number of icons is used, which
fits with a ratio-bias effect (Reyna & Brainerd, 2008).
Composite bar charts, on the other hand, while also effective
in reducing denominator neglect and visually displaying the
part-to-whole relationship (e.g., Stone et al., 2003), do so with
reference to bar areas rather than individual icons, and hence
may focus attention even further on proportions rather than the
absolute numbers involved. However, where the desire is to
emphasize risk (for example, to encourage behaviour change)
or deemphasize it (for example, to alleviate false fears), this
should also be considered when deciding on the most appro-
priate presentation format.
The participant sample in this experiment was perhaps un-
usual in terms of age, education, and numeracy. This may
have affected the analysis of the effects of numeracy and
makes comparisons with other studies more difficult. Future
studies should recruit more educationally heterogeneous sam-
ples. Alternatively, a more challenging measure of numeracy
should be employed that can adequately differentiate among
higher performing individuals or improve discriminability
among a general population (for suggestions, see Cokely,
Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012;
Frederick, 2005; Weller et al., 2013).
The problems in the present experiment incorporated a
marginal negative contingency and unequal base rates, mak-
ing them particularly difficult. While this strengthens the case
for composite bar charts as an effective means of communi-
cation of covariation information, further investigation is nec-
essary to determine whether the advantage holds for a wider
range of cause–effect contingencies (positive as well as nega-
tive). Furthermore, all three problems had identical normative
solutions, but participants might have avoided giving the same
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response each time for pragmatic reasons. This should be in-
vestigated by varying contingency type and level as a within-
subjects factor. As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, the
lack of explicit marginals in the CT condition (which repre-
sent denominators and are therefore necessary for normative
calculations) might have limited the comparison with re-
sponses in the BG condition in which the row totals could
be inferred more directly by the overall length of each bar.
However, we must note that the numbers involved in this
experiment were relatively congenial—that is, amenable to
simple additions and ratio calculations, since cell frequencies
were multiples of 10 and for all three problems the frequencies
for Cells C (120) and D (30) were constant; in turn, frequen-
cies were not always exactly discernible in the BG condition
(since the composite segments did not always align precisely
with the gridlines). Still, a contingency-table-with-marginals
condition would nevertheless be an interesting addition in
future experiments. As suggested by another reviewer, an av-
enue for future research could investigate whether making
proportions salient in a numerical format (e.g., using percent-
ages) enhances performance in a similar way to a graphical
format. It would also be interesting to determine the degree to
which the outcome bias—that is, the influence of the overall
base rate of the effect on contingency judgments—is moder-
ated by presentation format as suggested by F. Vallée-
Tourangeau et al. (2008), as well as numeracy.
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